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The Role of Law and the Function of the
Lawyer in the Developing Countries
Wolfgang G. Friedmann*
The function of law and the role of the lawyer are usually intimately
related to each other, but they are by no means necessarily interconnected or interdependent. Law can be-and in recent decades frequently has been-made by political commanders neither trained in
nor concerned with law as a disciplined science or ideology. Political
dictators, social revolutionaries, technocrats, all these may make the
laws by political fiat, with only the minimum possible participation by
the lawyer in the making and execution of these laws.
In societies that are based on the revolutionary upheaval of an
established order and pursue radically new social and economic goals,
the role of the lawyer tends to be depressed, his status lowly, his
function limited. This is so in the contemporary Communist societies
of Soviet Russia and China, although the importance of the lawyer appears to be gaining in the Soviet Union as it is being transformed
from a revolutionary into an evolutionary and relatively developed
society.
The fact that in revolutionary and other radically progressive societies-which include many of the newly sovereign emergent or
under-developed countries outside Europe-the function and status of
the lawyer tend to be modest underlines the traditionally conservative
function of the lawyer as a defender of established interests rather
than an innovator.
In the majority of contemporary democratic societies, the role of
the lawyer is important, in some cases (such as the United States)
predominant. This is so partly because a democratic constitution and
legal order-for all the differences between the various types of democracy-are based on a delicate and precarious balance of functions
and powers, which makes the role of the lawyer, as a trained
balancer, important. But it is also connected with the fact that in the
formative era of modern democracies, especially throughout the nine*Professor of International Law, Columbia University; author, Legal Theory (4th ed.
1960) (with Kalmanoff), joint International Business Ventures (1961), and numerous
other books and articles.
For some of the thoughts developed in this paper, the writer is indebted to a discussion on law and economic development held in December 1962 under the auspices of
the School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and to a
paper, as yet unpublished, by J. D. Nyhart, titled "Law and Economic Development."
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teenth and early twentieth centuries, the predominant economic philosophy of democracy was that of laissez faire, with private enterprise
as the chief instrument and promoter of economic activity and development. The function of the State remained restricted to defense,
foreign affairs, and certain limited administrative and police activities,
while the main stream of economic and social life proceeded through
private channels. Hence the predominant training and function of the
lawyer was in the field of private law, as counsel and advocate, as
judge litigating between private parties, and as legal scholar analyzing
the legal order and concepts of this type of society.
The change from laissez faire, free enterprise societies to welfare
state societies, with an increasing proportion of planning, public social
obligations, and public enterprise-a process that began in the Western
world in the nineteenth century and has continued with ever increasing acceleration during the twentieth century-found the lawyer
mentally and technically largely unprepared. It is significant, but not
very surprising that, especially in the Anglo-American legal world,
the analysis of the impact of planning and welfare ideology upon the
law has been almost passed by; by far the best known, though sterile,
contribution to the problem of planning and the rule of law has come
from an economist, Professor Hayek.' Hayek's simple conclusion is
that planning and the rule of law are incompatible, that the law
should only "provide signposts" but not "command people which road
to take."2 I have attempted elsewhere to demonstrate the total inadequacy of this conception of law, even in developed countries, for the
minimum needs of contemporary societies. 3
Lawyers have of course played a more or less important part as
legislators, in the shaping of modem planning and welfare legislation.
Their function, in this respect, has been greater in some than in other
countries. Essentially, however, they have contributed to this process
in their capacity as politicians, as legislators who happen to be lawyers
rather than economists, journalists, trade unionists, businessmen, or
engineers. The lawyer's skill may have been helpful in the drafting of
this or that piece of legislation but that is a very different matter
from bringing the lawyer's study of law, as a comprehensive science,
discipline, and technique, and as a vital instrument of social order,
to bear on the function of law in societies whose ideals, conditions,
and needs drastically differ from those of earlier times.
1. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).

2. Id. at 74.

3. See FRIEDMANN, LAw IN A CHANGING Socra-y, chapters 1, 16 (1959); see also
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 143, 149 (1958).
Cf. Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms-A Review of Robert L.
Hale's "Freedom Through Law," 54 CoLum. L. REv. 70 (1954).
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This reappraisal is particularly needed in the great majority of the
so-called underdeveloped countries, i.e., the great majority of nations
that have recently acquired political independence, because of a generally very low and static economic and social level. The characteristic feature of an undeveloped country is the stark gap between its
economic and social state and the minimum aspirations of a midtwentieth century state modeled upon the values and objectives of
the developed countries of the West. All these countries have an overwhelming need for rapid social and economic change. Much of this
must express itself in legal change-in constitutions, statutes, and administrative regulations. Law in such a state of social evolution is
less and less the recorder of established social, commercial, and other
customs; it becomes a pioneer, the articulated expression of the new
forces that seek to mold the life of the community according to new
patterns. In this type of society-which the underdeveloped countries
represent most radically, though by no means exclusively-ft is essential to reassess not only the function of law but the role of the lawyer.
In the tradition of the West, the lawyer has contributed to the development of the legal system, and thus in some way to the development of society, mainly as judge, advocate, and scholar. He has also
been concerned with legislative change-as a member of a law revision committee, a parliamentary or extra-parliamentary commission,
as an expert in a government department, or as a parliamentary draftsman. But here, as already mentioned in connection with the role of
the lawyer in planning and social welfare legislation, the technical
and the policy functions must be distinguished. As a parliamentary
draftsman or counsel, the lawyer is essentially the technician. As a
member of a law revision commission, or more fundamentally, as a
formulator of constitutional principles, the lawyer, usually in company
with non-lawyers, may play a major role in the shaping and articulation of the basic political and social foundations of the legal system.
In this latter role lawyers probably played a more important part
through the eighteenth century than in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. One thinks of the role that men like Hamilton
and Jefferson have played in the formative era of the American Constitution (and the latter also in other respects, such as in the codification of the Virginia laws). From the beginning of the nineteenth
century, together with the rise of positivism as the predominant legal
philosophy, the lawyer became more and more the craftsman, the
technical expert essentially detached from the policy-making role of
the social reformer and legislator. Jeremy Bentham stands out as the
most notable exception from this trend. He used the training of the
lawyer as well as the philosophy of a social utilitarian, combining
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these in a life-long struggle for legal reform in a multitude of fields,
from constitutions to civil codes, penal reform, and welfare institutions. To be sure, the society that Bentham sought and helped to
achieve was one radically different from the society aimed at by contemporary developing countries; it was a politically democratic, postfeudal society, leaving the utmost scope and freedom to private
commercial enterprise, with contracts as its most appropriate legal
instrument, as the best means of achieving the greatest possible prosperity for the greatest possible number. 4
Overwhelmingly, the lawyer has, in the recent evolution of Western
society, functioned as judge, advocate, or scholar. Because of the
differences between the inquisitorial type of procedure predominating
in the civil law world, and the adversary process predominating in
the common law world, the role of the advocate has, in the latter
group of systems, been the more articulate and significant. Perhaps
the role of the advocate in the shaping of basic legal principles is no
longer as prominent as it was a century ago. One thinks for example
of the part played by Daniel Webster in the evolution of the principles
of contract and eminent domain, in the Dartmouth College and West
River Bridge cases of 1819 and 1848.5 The fact that in the great
majority of American jurisdictions the argument of counsel is no
longer reported contributes to the outward diminution of the role of
the advocate. In fact, however, in the adversary processes of common law, and especially of American, litigation, the brief of counsel
still is of great, and sometimes decisive, significance in the shapingand often the decision-of the issues at hand. In this respect the role
of the advocate in the continental legal process is far more limited.
Nor does the continental judge, being an anonymous member of a
collective body, whose names are not published in the law reports,
and who must submit to majority decision behind closed doors, enjoy
the same extolled status as the judge of the common law world. But
apart from this difference of status and personal identification of great
judges with the evolution of the law-there are no equivalents of
Mansfield, Blackburn, Holmes, or Cardozo in the civil law worldthe function of the judge in both groups of systems is essentially the
same. With regard to the evolution of law as the major instrument
of social order, this function is of necessity marginal. Although we
have long departed from the illusion that the judge only applies the
4. The process by which the reforms in the British legislative processes and machinery, initiated by Bentham and his disciples, while designed to produce an extreme
economic liberalism, came to serve as the instruments of social reform, welfare legislation, and a partly socialized economy, has been classically analyzed by Dicey. See DxcEy,
LAw AND- PuBric OPINON iN ENLAND IN T=E NunmEnwTH CENTtRY (1905).
5. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17'U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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law and does not make it, the law he "makes" is subject to the limitation imposed by the fact that he can decide only the issues that happen to come before the court and to the limitations imposed by
statutes and precedent upon the judicial shaping of the law. The
judge's function in the evolution of law, while important both in the
continental and the common law systems, is esseiitially arbitral. It is,
of course, cobsiderably greater where, as in the United States, judges
are called upon to interpret a constitution, i.e., a set of basic principles
governing the political, social, and economic life of the nation. But
even here the function of interpretation, while often of decisive importance for the social life of the nation, is not part of a deliberate social
plan.
By contrast, the legal scholar has the complete freedom-and it is
his principal opportunity-to survey and appraise the legal system,
both as a whole and in its individual manifestations, as an instrument
and function of social order. In the reorientation and reassessment
of the function of law as an instrument of social engineering, the
work and thinking of such men as Bentham, Ihering, and Dicey in
the nineteenth century and of iRoscoe Pound and Francois G'ny in
the twentieth century have been of fundamental importance. An
obvious limitation on the contribution of the scholar to the use of
law as an instrument of social change is his remoteness from the
practical tasks of making and administering the law in governments,
parliaments, or administrative agencies.
When we look at the role played by the lawyer in the Western
world in the last century and a half, not from the point of view of
division of functions but of ideological attitudes, it is difficult to deny
that he has overwhelmingly been a defender of the established order
and of vested interests. If, in the axiology that has dominated Western political and legal philosophy since Locke, we regard property
as an incorporation of the economic and commercial interests, and
life and liberty as the incorporation of the interests in personal integrity, the lawyer has certainly been, in the economic sphere, overwhelmingly the defender of property interests, for the simple reason
that in a society dominated by commerce and industry the individual
and corporate owners of property have been the principal clients.
Correspondingly, the role of the lawyer has been generally more
important in the shaping of private than of public law. As stated
earlier, private law was until recently the much more important and
dynamic part of the Western legal systems.
With regard to individual liberties the lawyer, especially in criminal
and administrative processes, has often been a vital defender of liberties against official arbitrariness. One thinks of the role played by
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Lord Carson in the defense and ultimate vindication of a wrongly
disciplined naval cadet against the stubbornness of official bureaucracy (as dramatized by "The Winslow Boy"). But one has only to
look at the recurrent themes and contents of the annual speeches of
Presidents, bar associations, law societies, and the like, on the role of
law to see that the defense of individual liberty has almost been automatically identified with the ideology of a liberal society. Administrative arbitrariness-which does exist-has been all too often identified
with social planning as such. The Dicey fallacy that wide discretionary power in the hands of government is of necessity also arbitrary
power still looms very large in the minds and actions of contemporary
lawyers, or at least in the pronouncements of their appointed representatives.
The continuing vital importance of the lawyer's function as a
defender of both personal and economic rights against arbitrary
interference can hardly be exaggerated. In these days of military
dictatorships, the frequent muzzling of the press and other media of
information, the stifling of open discussion, and confiscations of
both national and foreign property interests, the protection of the
legitimate interests of the individual, and most especially of his personal liberties as expressed in the minimum requisites of due process,
remains one of the most important and noblest of the lawyer's
functions.
But it is no longer sufficient. If the lawyer continues to be identified, as he predominantly is at the present time, with the defense of
the existing order and of vested interests, against the urgent needs
and interests of societies that must lift themselves from poverty and
stagnation to a radically higher level of economic and social development, often within a desperately short time, the lawyer will eventually
be reduced to an inferior and despised status in the developing nations. The contemporary lawyer in all states, but most emphatically
so in the developing nations, must become an active and responsible
participant in the shaping and formulation of development plans. He
must guide and counsel but also warn where necessary. He must
acknowledge the drastically increased role of public law in developing
societies, which usually have inadequate resources, a totally inadequate quality and quantity of responsible private venture capital,
gross educational deficiencies, and a minimum of technical skills and
administrative experience. These nations must plan for their future;
they must seek to use and develop their resources for the maximum
benefit of the community, even where they admit and desire a large
share of private investment and enterprise.
It may be helpful to illustrate the challenge to the lawyer in devel-
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oping societies by a few typical examples. An all too frequent feature
in developing societies is the presence of large private landholdings,
often held by absentee owners, impeding the development of a
healthy agricultural economy, whether based on a system of individual
peasant holdings or on cooperative farming. Very often these large
land areas will also be needed for irrigation or for industrial development purposes. On the other hand, an industrial development or
resettlement scheme may affect not absentee landowners but working
peasants and smallholders. In such situations, the political planners
will tend, and justly so, to differentiate between the various types of
interests affected, according to the social and economic equities. They
cannot be expected to treat large absentee landholders, who have
collected excessive rents-often through rapacious middlemen-for
decades or centuries, in the same way as the working smallholder.
The lawyer would traditionally tend to regard all vested rights as
equally worthy of protection. It is precisely this attitude that would
tend to bring him into disrespect in developing societies. On the
other hand, the political planner, unaided by the lawyer, would tend
to ride roughshod over any private interests that may stand in the
path of rapid planning. It is the lawyer's task, not only to ensure a
proper balance between these competing interests with a sense of
justice that should be sharpened by his legal training, but also to
ensure that the minimum safeguards of due process be preserved in
order to have these matters ultimately settled by an impartial authority. But, for example, to let the courts decide the adequacy of compensation offered for expropriations made in the public interest, presupposes a judiciary that is not in ideological opposition to the very
principles of the new order. Such a supposition may well be erroneous, as is illustrated by the conduct of the German judiciary during the
Weimar Republic.
A related issue that has arisen quite often in recent decades and
has been the predominant subject of debate among international
lawyers and in the U.N. debates leading to the resolution on the
permanent control over natural resources, is the expropriation of foreign interests and their transfer into national, usually public, control.
These matters also normally form part of the national development
policies and planning processes, even though in some cases an element of political retaliation may predominate (as in the cases of the
nationalization of the Suez Canal, or of the Dutch tobacco interests
in Indonesia, or the confiscation of American-owned sugar refineries
in Cuba). Here again the discussion, and especially the predominant
attitude of lawyers, has been characterized by a formalistic approach.
The great majority of Western lawyers have based their opinions
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solely on the theory of vested rights and demanded the same standards of compensation for the expropriation of foreign interests regardless of the manner of acquisition and exploitation. On the other side,
the representatives of some of the underdeveloped countries have
been equally one-sided in denying any right to compensation, other
than as a matter of discretion by the expropriating government. I
have suggested elsewhere6 that the only way of attaining an orderly
development of the process of adjustment between the once overwhelmingly colonial or quasi-colonial property interests, and the aspirations of developing countries, must consist in a linking of claims to
the balance sheet of advantages and deprivations. If an expropriated
enterprise has over a long period, under the protection of military or
economic power, exploited native wealth and labor in excess of the
benefits which it has brought to the country through the development
of agricultural, commercial, or industrial values, then the claim to
compensation has a much weaker and more limited basis than where
the foreign enterprise has been developed on the basis of a free agreement, based on commercial principles, fair labor standards, and other
welfare aspects. Here again it is of crucial importance that the lawyer
should not identify himself one-sidedly with the defense of vested
interests but should contribute actively, and with an understanding
of the issues at stake, to the responsible development and regulation
of the planning processes, and to the adjustment of the competing
claims of the interests of capital exporting and capital importing
countries.
An ever increasing-though in the analysis of the functions of law
and the lawyer, much neglected-part of the work of the lawyer is
neither litigation nor the resolution of disputes. It lies in the shaping
and formulation of policies, in the exercise of legal powers, constructively establishing or altering the relations between private legal
parties inter se, between public authorities and private parties, between governments and foreign investors, and the like. In the public
international sphere this task consists increasingly-and most notably
in the case of developing countries-in the formulation of economic
policies expressed in accession to multilateral trade agreements (such
as GATT) or the conclusion of bilateral treaties. In the latter sphere,
a decisive difference exists between treaties concluded with a state
trading nation and those made with a free trading nation. These are
not matters of form only; they presuppose an appreciation of the role
played by foreign trade in the national economic development. The
implications of bilateral or multilateral trade agreements do not have
6. See Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 Am. J. INT'L LAw 279 (1963), and Social Conflict and the Protection
of Foreign Investment Proceedings, 1963 Am. Soc. Irr'L LAw 126.
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only economic aspects; the decision, for example, whether a country
like India or Tanganyika should accede to GATT-a multilateral treaty
aspiring to international free trade, based on the principle of the mostfavored-nation clause-or whether it should enter into a bilateral
trade agreement with the United States or the Soviet Union, implies
policy considerations of profound political importance. Similarly,
whether to permit a foreign oil company to construct an oil refinery
and, if so, whether to give it a monopoly of the crude oil supply or
of tanker transport; whether to keep basic industries and utilities under public national ownership or, for the sake of more rapid and
skilled development, to make exemptions in favor of private foreign
entrepreneurs; whether to accompany such policy with special tax or
other financial concessions, or modifications of import-export policythese and a multitude of other questions vital in the life of any developing country today require a basic understanding of the political
and economic issues involved. In all these questions, the lawyer must
play an important, often a decisive, part. It is he who must draft the
necessary legislation or the complex international agreements; it is he
who will usually be the principal, or one of the principal, representatives of his country in international trade negotiations. It is he who
must draft the applications for loans from national or international credit agencies, such as the World Bank or the United States
Agency for International Development, or formulate the modalities
and conditions of joint business ventures, between his own government or a private enterprise in his own country on the one side, and
a private enterprise or a foreign consortium, a foreign government,
or a public international agency on the other side.7 It would be as
artificial as it would be wasteful of the still desperately scarce trained
manpower resources of developing countries to believe that the lawyer
should or could confine himself to the strictly legal issues, such as the
validity of the contract or treaty revision clause, or the legal position
of a minority shareholder under company law. Indeed, the "general
counsel," a concept notably developed in this country, implies far
more than technical legal advice. The general counsel, both of public
agencies such as AID and of private corporations, actively participates
in the policies as well as in the ultimate formulation of international
business transactions. In the case of transactions between developed
and developing countries, legal counsel on both sides are inevitably
involved in an intricate mixture of policy issues and questions of public law, private law, and administration. All this requires a type of
lawyer, on both the public and the private level, who has a different
7. For example, the International Finance Corporation is now permitted and seeks
to take equity participations in conjunction with loans granted for development aid.
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approach and a different background of knowledge from his predecessors. He cannot be expected to be an expert economist or engineer,
but he can be given an understanding of the basic issues. Indeed it is
the generally recognized ability of the lawyer, by virtue of his training
in organized thinking, to think himself into a number of different subjects that largely accounts for the preeminent role played by lawyers
in the chairmanship of commissions that deal with a vast variety of
subject matters, as well as for the high proportion of lawyers, at least
in most Western countries, in legislative as well as administrative
positions. A basic training in economics has long been regarded in a
number of countries as an essential part of the introductory training
of the lawyer. At the present time there are plans under way, in
some of the developing countries, to give a general introduction to
the subjects just mentioned, to lawyers and other general public
servants.
Even within the province of the law, there will have to be a shift
of emphasis, and again particularly so in the developing countries.
Since most of the important planning decisions, both nationally and
internationally, involve the relations between governments and private
legal subjects (corporate or individuals), and since many of the major
planning decisions inevitably involve some interference with property
and other private interests, a study of administrative law becomes increasingly important. But it has to be a concept of administrative
law wider than that prevalent in the teaching and scholarship of this
country, where it entails essentially a study of the procedural safeguards of the citizen against administrative power. In the developing
countries it must correspond more closely to the wider compass of the
discipline as understood in England, and even more fully in France
and other continental countries. Droit administratif comprises the
totality of legal relations between public authorities inter se, and between public authorities and private subjects. As developed by the
jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat and of corresponding continental
tribunals, it involves not only the legal processes determining the limits
of administrative discretion and the procedural safeguards of the
citizen through judicial or quasi-judicial procedures; it involves also
the study of the administrative contract as an important way of regulating the manifold relations between public authority and private
citizens in the provision of supplies and services. This concept may
have increasing significance to international transactions between
governments and private foreign investors. 8 Internally, the function
and status of the public enterprise is of crucial importance in almost
8. See FAotmRos, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORs (1962); Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57
A.m. J. INTL LANv 279, 290 (1963).
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all the developing countries which seek to combine the principle of
public control over vital commodities and services with the retention
of some freedom of movement and initiative in the development of
resources and the conduct of business. Hence the significance of contemporary development corporations which are either public, mixed,
or private corporations, but which almost inevitably involve a specific
legal status, and special relations with the government. Understood
in this wider sense, administrative law will be the principal instrument of adjusting the interests of the public, as represented by the
government, and of the private citizens, as represented by contractors,
foreign investors, and the like.
The preceding pages have attempted no more than to give a tentative, summary, and incomplete description of the role that the modern
lawyer has to exercise in legal systems where the emphasis has largely
shifted from the private to the public sphere, from a laissez faire
economy to a mixed or a state-directed economy, and in any case to
economies directed by an overall development plan.
It is only by actively entering into this process, by equipping himself as far as possible with the outlook and knowledge required for
this more flexible, and also far more responsible, function of the law
in the developing countries of our time that the lawyer can hope to
retain or even broaden the role that he has traditionally played in the
countries of the Western world.

